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HOLDING THE ENABLERS RESPONSIBLE:  
APPLYING SEC RULE 10B-5 LIABILITY TO THE 
CREDIT RATING INSTITUTIONS 
Christopher Schmitt* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1942, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) formulated a 
Rule to protect against disingenuous representations made in connection 
with securities trading:  SEC Rule 10b-5.
1
  The Rule was adopted in 
reaction to a very specific situation not addressed by the securities laws—a 
company president had purposely driven down the price of his company‘s 
shares before the release of a favorable earnings report to manufacture a 
better return.
2
  Yet, at its core, Rule 10b-5 had a much larger purpose—to 
ward off the type of market manipulation that led to the 1929 stock market 
crash.
3
  Since then, the scope of the Rule has grown immensely to become 
a ―catch-all‖ clause to prevent the use of ―manipulative devices‖ in 
conjunction with securities trading.
4
 
Today, credit rating agencies face similar perverse incentives to make 
disingenuous representations that manipulate securities trading.  Securities 
issuers have the ability to ―shop‖ for more favorable ratings in order to 
make their products as lucrative as possible, and the ratings agencies are 
paid handsomely to participate.  In fact, such reckless appraisals by these 
agencies were a significant catalyst in the recent financial crisis.
5
  Former 
 
*  Thank you Professor Booth (Villanova Law School) for all of your guidance and 
support, without which, this comment would not have been possible. 
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  Part (b) of Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to make any 
untrue statements of material fact or to omit material facts necessary in order to make 
statements not misleading. 
 2. Jonn R. Beeson, Comment, Rounding the Peg to Fit the Hole:  A Proposed 
Regulatory Reform of the Misappropriation Theory, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1077, 1107 (1996). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (citing Congressional 
testimony by one of the drafters that ―[t]he section was described rightly as a ‗catchall‘ 
clause to enable the Commission ‗to deal with new manipulative [or cunning] devices.‘‖). 
 5. The ratings agencies ―played a crucial role in the epochal housing market collapse, 
affixing their most laudatory grades to billions of dollars worth of bonds that went bad in the 
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Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray even went as far as to state that the 
agencies‘ ―total disregard for the life‘s work of ordinary Ohioans caused 
the collapse of our housing and credit markets and is at the heart of what‘s 
wrong with Wall Street today.‖
6
 
Problematically, no mechanisms are being utilized to hold these 
agencies liable for the damages they have encouraged.  Much like the more 
pedestrian book and movie reviews, credit rating agencies and their 
investment recommendations command broad First Amendment free 
speech protections, which have shielded them from liability.
7
  But the 
instances in which these assessments turned out to be false, damaging, and 
reckless can no longer be ignored.  These are not statements of mere 
opinion that deserve First Amendment protections, but are instead carefully 
reasoned representations made for the explicit purpose of industry reliance.  
Rule 10b-5 naturally applies to police such ratings and should be used 
immediately to prosecute material misrepresentations made by the ratings 
agencies. 
 
subprime crisis.‖  David Segal, Debt-Rating Agencies Avoid Broad Overhaul After Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A1.  See also Caitlin M. Mulligan, From AAA to F:  How the 
Credit Rating Agencies Failed America and What Can Be Done to Protect Investors, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1275, 1288-89 (2009) (―Although many participants share responsibility for 
the crumbling financial market, regulators have cited credit ratings in general and credit 
rating agencies in particular, as having failed the marketplace.‖); Amanda Bahena, What 
Role Did Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) Play in the Financial Crisis?, (unpublished poster 
presentation, University of Iowa Center for International Finance and Development), 
available at 
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/issues/financial_crisis/posters/Amanda%20Final%20Draft.
pdf (containing a detailed analysis of the Credit Rating agencies as a crucial industry 
mechanism). 
 6. Segal, supra note 5. 
 7. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (holding that ―a 
statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be 
liability under state defamation law, at least in situations . . . where a media defendant is 
involved,‖ although, reserving judgment on cases involving non-media defendants); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (U.S. 1957) (―The protection given speech and press was 
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.‖); see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985) 
(―To the extent that the chart service contains factual information about past transactions 
and market trends, and the newsletters contain commentary on general market conditions, 
there can be no doubt about the protected character of the communications . . . .‖); Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (stating that the purpose of the First 
Amendment was to protect free discussion); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) 
(precluding redress under a false reporting statute in the absence of proof that the defendant 
published the report with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth).  But cf. 
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (providing an example of the Supreme 
Court severely curtailing commercial free speech by holding that ―the Constitution imposes 
no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising . . . . [T]o what 
extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for 
legislative judgment.‖). 
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As our financial markets struggle to recover from near-collapse, Rule 
10b-5 can fill a regulatory void by confronting and deterring some of the 
reckless behavior that put the American economy into its current 
predicament.  Such statements by ratings agencies are sufficiently material 
to extend beyond mere expressions of opinion, and the SEC certainly 
retains jurisdiction to enforce this Rule against the rating agencies.  I will 
argue that there is no inherent reason to protect these for-profit appraisals 
with the protections of the First Amendment, and that strong public policy 
considerations demand that Rule 10b-5 be given full effect against these 
agencies.
8
 
II.  PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
Ratings necessarily make a particular investment more or less 
attractive.  This creates perverse incentives that are not currently 
counterbalanced by any consistent threat of liability, other than from 
outright fraud when it exists and can be proven.
9
  It is therefore important 
to recognize that these disastrous miscalculations were not mere 
unfortunate accidents, but exactly the sort of chaos that would be expected 
to materialize from such a skewed incentive structure.  This potential 
conflict has been flagged before: 
Without question, the credit rating system is one of the 
capitalism‘s strangest hybrids:  profit-making companies that 
perform what is essentially a regulatory role.  The companies 
serve the public, which expect them to stamp their imprimatur on 
safe securities and safe securities alone.  But they also serve their 
shareholders, who profit whenever that imprimatur shows up on a 
security, safe or not.
10
 
In fact, the problem is best illustrated through the practice of ―rate 
shopping,‖ where the issuing party of a security will solicit several rating 
agencies in an attempt to secure the most lucrative rating possible.
11
  This 
 
 8. ―[C]redit rating agencies have used the [First Amendment] privilege more 
effectively than any other gatekeeper, to avoid not only liability but also regulatory 
scrutiny.‖  Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, at 88 (Univ. of San Diego Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-46, May 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257. 
 9. See Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Rating Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
23, 2008, at B1 (attributing the ―disastrous performance of credit rating agencies in 
assessing the risks of mortgage-backed securities‖ to inherent conflicts of interest in the 
business model, according to former officials at Moody‘s Investors Service and Standard & 
Poor‘s). 
 10. Segal, supra note 5. 
 11. See generally Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Chief Targets the Credit Raters, WALL ST. J., 
July 15, 2009, at C10 (detailing SEC‘s interest in proposals to curb conflicts of interest and 
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practice makes explicit the erosion of agency objectivity in the pursuit of 
profitability.  At the very least, such a system encourages companies to err 
in favor of providing more favorable ratings, but at its worst, encourages 
outright fraud and deception. 
Even the agency analysts themselves acknowledged the problems 
stemming from such skewed incentives, but business continued perilously 
as usual.  In one now-infamous email, a Standard & Poor‘s (S&P) 
employee wrote to a co-worker that a particular investment they were 
rating was ―ridiculous‖ and that they ―should not be rating it,‖ to which the 
co-worker retorted that ―we rate every deal‖ and that ―it could be structured 
by cows and we would rate it.‖
12
 
Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Jr. brought this problem to the 
nation‘s attention back in 2007: 
Now, investors are relying on credit ratings to make informed 
investment decisions, but the credit rating firms are paid not by 
investors but by the companies they rate.  And as complex, 
structured debt products have increased in popularity, the 
relationship between rater and issue became even closer—and the 
line between independent rater and paid advisor became blurred.  
This very circumstance suggests that a potential conflict of 
interest—between providing objective ratings and satisfying their 
corporate clients may be distorting the rating agencies‘ judgment.  
That they are both coach and referee.
13
 
SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, agreed that the agencies were faced 
with a ―triple-A conflict of interest‖: 
[I]t was well understood that certain conflicts of interest were 
hardwired into the rating agency business model.  But we have 
learned since then that the ratings of structured products in the 
subprime area made those conflicts of interest even more acute. 
That's because structured products were specifically designed for 
each tranche to achieve a particular credit rating—and the ratings 
agencies then made a lucrative business of consulting with 
issuers on exactly how to go about getting those ratings.  Selling 
consulting services to entities that purchased ratings became a 
 
improve transparency and accountability by ratings companies, including ways to end the 
practice of issuers ―shopping‖ for the best ratings). 
 12. Aaron Lucchetti, Internal S&P Emails Derided Ratings Rush, SMARTMONEY, Aug. 
4, 2009, http://www.smartmoney.com/breaking-news/smw/?story=20080804091712.  In 
another instance, ―an analytical manager in the collateralized debt obligations group at S&P 
told a senior analytical manager in a separate email that ‗rating agencies continue to create‘ 
an ‗even bigger monster--the [Collateralized Debt Obligation] market.  Let‘s hope we are all 
wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters . . . .‘‖  Id. 
 13. Arthur Levitt Jr., Former Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n, Strengthening 
the Gatekeepers:  The Importance of Independence and Accountability to the Capital 
Markets, Luncheon Address to the Ontario Sec. Comm‘n (Nov. 27, 2007). 
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triple-A conflict of interest.
14
 
The recent case Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & 
Co. offers an especially egregious example of this conflict of interest at 
work.
15
  There, the accused ratings agency worked to package securities in 
such a way as to reverse-engineer a ―top rating‖ for the benefit of the 
investment‘s marketability.
16
  Even more astonishing, their compensation 
for doing so was over three times the going rate and was ―contingent upon 
the receipt of desired ratings . . . and only in the event that the transaction 
closed with those ratings.‖
17
  In other words, the agency was being paid to 
manufacture a specific rating, not to objectively rate the security.  The 
court acknowledged that the conflict of interest was not inherently 
dispositive of ―knowingly‖ making a ―false or misleading statement.‖
18
   
But where both the Rating Agencies and Morgan Stanley knew 
that the ratings process was flawed, knew that the portfolio was 
not a safe, stable investment, and knew that the Rating Agencies 
could not issue an objective rating because of the effect it would 
have on their compensation, it may be plausibly inferred that 
Morgan Stanley and the Rating Agencies knew they were 
disseminating false and misleading ratings.
19
 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank has offered some very limited 
advancements against the impunity of the ratings agencies, in theorizing 
that such appraisals may not be subject to protection when they are made 
for the benefit of very specific audiences.
20
  I will expand on this theory by 
arguing that Rule 10b-5 provides, on the whole, a more complete, reliable, 
 
 14. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm‘n, Statement at Open 
Meeting on Rules for Credit Rating Agencies (June 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch061108cc.htm. 
 15. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 16. Id. at 166-67.  In fact, these were the highest ratings ever given to that particular 
sort of security to date.  Id. at 165. 
 17. Id. at 167. 
 18. Id. at 178-79. 
 19. Id. at 179. 
 20. First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. held that: 
It is widely recognized that in the absence of a contract, fiduciary relationship, 
or intent to cause injury, a newspaper publisher is not liable to a member of the 
public for a non-defamatory negligent misstatement of an item of news, ―unless 
he wilfully . . . circulates it knowing it to be false, and it is calculated to and 
does . . . result in injury to another person.‖ 
670 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (quoting 58 American Jurisprudence 2d 
Newspapers, Periodicals & Press Assns. § 22 (1971)); see also Judge Rejects Credit Rating 
Firms’ Free-Speech Claims, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, (Sept. 3, 2009, 6:49 PM ET), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/09/03/judge-rejects-credit-rating-firms-free-speech-claims/ 
(commenting on the Abu Dhabi decision). 
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and established method for attack in situations where the ratings are not 
outright fraudulent.  With great power comes great responsibility, and Rule 
10b-5 would couple the immense economic power of the rating agencies 
with corresponding liability and deterrence.
21
  Moreover, when suspicious 
ratings do become the subject of litigation, the burden would be turned on 
to the rating agency to substantiate that the rating was not recklessly made. 
III.  THE AMERICAN ECONOMY RELIES ON RATING AGENCIES 
In today‘s complex economy, consumers are forced to rely on expert 
ratings when investing in highly complicated financial products.  In fact, 
using rating agencies is often a requirement:
22
  ―[s]tatutes and rules require 
that mutual fund and money managers of almost every stripe buy only 
those bonds that have been given high grades by a Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization . . . .‖
23
 
Such regulations fuel a particularly dangerous cycle, extending more 
favorable regulatory treatment to credit rating agencies while ―prohibit[ing] 
many of the biggest purchasers of bonds, like pension funds, insurance 
companies, and banks, from purchasing low or unrated debt and, as a 
consequence, increas[ing] the demand for ratings.‖
24
  While the aim of such 
restrictions is to make sensitive investments more secure, they have created 
a perverse incentive for the agencies to capture the ―voracious‖ appetite of 
these major investors.
25
 
Distressingly, the sorts of funds that are required to stick to top rated 
investments are often those relied upon for vital civic purposes such as 
pension and retirement funds, university endowments, municipal bonds, 
and other governmental services.
26
  While these are precisely the sort of 
 
 21. It is also a more uniform method.  State law may allow similar lawsuits to go 
forward, but this is currently a state-by-state determination, subject to strategizing. 
 22. See SEC, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the 
Operation of the Securities Markets, at 8 (Jan. 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (providing examples of Congress 
incorporating the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations into a variety of 
financial legislations). 
 23. Segal, supra note 5. 
 24. Kia Dennis, The Ratings Game:  Explaining Rating Agency Failures in the Build 
Up to the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1117 (2009); see generally Sec. & 
Exch. Comm‘n Report, supra note 22 (explaining the ―[i]mportance of the Role of Credit 
Rating Agencies to Investors and the Functioning of the Securities Markets‖). 
 25. See Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently Conflicted:  Credit Rating Agencies 
in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 281 (2009) (―Yet, 
instead of being punished, the credit rating agencies were rewarded by the marketplace; 
institutional investor appetite for mortgage-backed securities and CDOs based on them 
increased voraciously until 2007, and the major credit rating agencies profited handsomely 
as a result.‖). 
 26. See id. at 244 (citing U.S. SEC, Report On The Role And Function Of Credit 
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investments that require the most stability, the credit rating agencies have 
an incentive to inflate ratings in order to sell these entities debt that they 
would otherwise be restricted from purchasing.
27
  In relying on such 
ratings, these funds were unaware of the amount of risk they were actually 
assuming, and a ―House of Cards‖ was built, primed for collapse.
28
 
IV.  CURRENT LIABILITY FOR AGENCIES 
The current First Amendment standard requires real fraud in light of 
established First Amendment protections.
29
 
In a wide array of circumstances, state and federal courts have 
consistently recognized that S&P and other rating agencies are entitled to 
the same First Amendment protections as other financial publishers such as 
BusinessWeek and The Wall Street Journal.  These decisions have been 
based on widespread judicial recognition that, at their core, rating agencies 
perform First Amendment functions by gathering information, analyzing it 
and disseminating opinions about it—in the form of credit ratings and 
commentary—to the general public.
30
 
From a policy perspective, the fear is that excessive restrictions on 
these ratings would have a chilling effect on investment recommendations.  
This would, in turn, deprive investors of the very information they need to 
manage risk: 
Courts cannot constitutionally allow recovery on any showing 
less than recklessness because of the potential chilling effect that 
imposing a negligence standard would have on rating 
 
Ratings Agencies In The Operation Of The Securities Markets, at 41-42 (2003)).  ―Many 
institutional investors, pursuant to regulations, are forbidden or discouraged from 
purchasing certain low rating securities.  Federal and state regulators, as well as 
international organizations, often adopt the credit rating agencies‘ ratings in order to 
determine the creditworthiness and credit risk of assets held by certain regulated entities, 
such as commercial banks and insurance companies, and the minimum capitalization 
requirements for these entities.‖  Id. 
 27. See Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1977) (concerning ―an 
institution authorized by statute only to invest in prime paper‖). 
 28. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS (2009) (detailing the events leading up to 
the financial crisis). 
 29. ―It is well-established that under typical circumstances, the First Amendment 
protects rating agencies, subject to an ‗actual malice‘ exception, from liability arising out of 
their issuance of ratings and reports because their ratings are considered matters of public 
concern.‖  Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d. 155, 
175 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  Of course, state law causes of action can go forward where there is 
actual fraud or misrepresentation.  See, e.g., Quinn v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 168 F.3d 331, 336 
(7th Cir. 1999) (finding no negligent misrepresentation on behalf of the ratings agency 
under state law, due to lack of reasonable reliance). 
 30. Standard & Poor‘s ―Exhibit 2‖ document (on file with the author) (providing an 
example of such opinion). 
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publications.  Given the importance of financial information to 
investors and the economy as a whole, bond rating constitutes a 
matter of ―public concern.‖  Applying traditional [F]irst 
[A]mendment law, the state's interest in compensating relying 
investors must give way to the [F]irst [A]mendment's concern for 
the free flow of commercial information.  Society must rely on 
the market and competition to keep rating agencies operating at 
their negligence threshold, not on courts and juries.
31
 
As will be established later, ―recklessness‖ does in fact seem to be a 
fair and workable standard.  Yet, in light of the sentiments laid out above, 
credit agencies have commanded vast free speech protection, being held to 
the ―actual malice standard.‖
32
  Following this, courts have been reluctant 
to go any further due to the allegedly opinionated, free speech nature of 
such ratings.
33
 
An example of this is in Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors 
Services, a case in which a computer corporation alleged defamation 
stemming from what it perceived was an unduly negative credit rating it 
received for its business.
34
  Beyond finding no actual malice on the part of 
the rating agency,
35
 the court further found no defamation, holding that a 
―credit rating is a predictive opinion, dependent on a subjective and 
discretionary weighing of complex factors‖ and that there was ―no basis 
upon which we could conclude that the credit rating itself communicates 
any provably false factual connotation.‖
36
 
Similarly, in the case of Jefferson County School District v. Moody's 
Investor's Services, Inc., the court found no injury for a credit rating 
agency‘s appraisal giving a generally bad outlook for the school system‘s 
 
 31. Gregory Husisian, Note, What Standard of Care Should Govern the World’s 
Shortest Editorials?:  An Analysis of Bond Rating Agency Liability, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 
410, 460 (1990). 
 32. County of Orange v. McGraw Hill Cos., 245 B.R. 151, 156 n.4 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
 33. ―[A] statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not 
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.‖  
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).  However, this does not appear to 
cover all matters of opinion.  ―Stated another way, the Court immunized only pure, 
evaluative opinion.  Thus, a pure deductive opinion, which is provable as true or false on the 
basis of objective evidence, carries no immunity.‖  Kathryn Dix Sowle, A Matter of 
Opinion:  Milkovich Four Years Later, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 467, 474 (1994).  The 
latter conceptualization would appear applicable to hold the credit ratings agencies liable. 
 34. Compuware Corp. v. Moody‘s Investors Servs., 499 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(alleging that Moody‘s downgrade of Compuware‘s ratings were unjustified). 
 35. Id. at 528 (applying an ―actual malice standard‖).  Actual malice requires 
―knowledge . . . that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.‖  
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  In this, while a failure to do 
due diligence may not be reckless itself, ―purposeful avoidance of the truth‖ is sufficient.  
Harte-Hanks Commc‘ns v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989). 
 36. Compuware, 499 F.3d at 529. 
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bonds.
37
  Here, the court found statements such as ―negative outlook‖ and 
―ongoing financial pressures‖ were ―too indefinite to apply to a false 
statement of fact,‖ but that if they were ―coupled with specific factual 
assertions, such statements might not be immunized from defamation 
claims by the First Amendment.‖
38
  Thus, courts concur that appraisals fall 
outside First Amendment bounds when such statements transcend vague 
opinion and take on the contours of fact:  ―If such an opinion were shown 
to have materially false components, the issuer should not be shielded from 
liability by raising the word ‗opinion‘ as a shibboleth.‖
39
 
Such an avenue of attack was implemented in a very recent decision 
by the Southern District of New York opening the door for the application 
of 10b-5 to credit rating agencies, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan 
Stanley & Co.
40
  Specifically, while the First Amendment has been used to 
shield agencies claiming that their ratings are matters of public concern, the 
developing legal theory in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank targeted 
statements of more limited, private concern.
41
  ―Where a rating agency has 
disseminated their ratings to a select group of investors rather than to the 
public at large, the rating agency is not afforded the same protection.‖
42
  
Judge Scheindlin rejected free speech claims where ratings agencies were 
intimately involved in evaluating a particular investment vehicle.
43
  
Moreover, the court rejected the agencies‘ claim that these were non-
actionable opinions.
44
  Such opinions ―may still be actionable if the speaker 
 
 37. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Moody‘s Investor‘s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 850 
(10th Cir. 1999) (affirming district court‘s dismissal of school district‘s complaint on the 
grounds that no relief could be granted). 
 38. Id. at 856. 
 39. Id.  But see David Segal, A Matter of Opinion?, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at BU1 
(describing how in pending litigation against financial services company Standard & Poor‘s, 
attorney Floyd Abrams will attempt to further this argument that such investment appraisals 
―deserve exactly the sort of free-speech protections afforded to journalists, on the theory that 
a bond rating is like an editorial—an opinion based on an educated guess about the future‖). 
 40. WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, supra note 20. 
 41. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 175 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (distinguishing ratings sent to a certain group of investors from ratings 
available to the general public). 
 42. Id.  See also In re Fitch, Inc., 330 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the credit 
rating agency did not deserve journalist privilege where it was client-driven and actively 
involved in structuring the underlying transactions).  But see In re Republic Nat‘l Life Ins. 
Co., 387 F. Supp. 902, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (granting a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss where ―[t]he moving defendants had no transactions of any kind with the plaintiffs, . 
. . no duty which was breached,‖ and therefore defendants were ―not accountable to 
plaintiffs under the federal securities laws for their stock speculations‖ in stating that the 
public stock was a ―good investment‖). 
 43. Abu Dhabi, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (noting that the ratings agency had a more 
integral role in the structuring of the security than the typical agency). 
 44. Id. at 176 (holding that the opinions were ―actionable misrepresentations‖). 
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does not genuinely and reasonably believe [them]‖
45
 and where the 
plaintiffs have met the burden of alleging that the agencies did not have 
sufficient belief in fact to make such appraisals.
46
  So far, this is ―the first 
major ruling upholding fraud allegations against an arranger and the rating 
agencies on the instruments that are at the heart of the financial crisis.‖
47
 
Such a conclusion may have been inevitable, especially in light of 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.
48
  Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss 
Builders was a defamation case alleging that a credit reporting agency 
―grossly misrepresented respondent's assets and liabilities‖ in a report to its 
subscribers.
49
  There, the court found a ―reduced constitutional value of 
speech involving no matters of public concern,‖ specifically when prepared 
for a ―specific business audience.‖
50
  Moreover, such traditional notions of 
privity seem easily applicable to credit rating agencies: 
Rating firms . . . could have a hard time claiming free-speech 
rights if courts construe their ratings of mortgage-backed 
securities to be akin to private commercial transactions.  ―The 
more it looks like [ratings] firms were hired specifically to do this 
one rating for this one company . . . the less likely it is that the 
First Amendment will be applied.‖
51
 
While liability in the context of privity is not a radical concept, 
holding such agencies more generally liable for public statements has not 
been fully explored.  I will argue that privity is not a necessary component 
for agency liability under Rule 10b-5.  The holdings of the cases above, 
specifically Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, should be applied to the credit 
rating agencies and the statements they promulgate to the financial markets. 
 
 45. Id. (quoting In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 46. Id.  Moreover, ―disclaimers in the Information Memoranda that ‗[a] credit rating 
represents a Rating Agency‘s opinion regarding credit quality and is not a guarantee of 
performance or a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any securities,‘ are unavailing and 
insufficient to protect the Rating Agencies from liability for promulgating misleading 
ratings.‖  Id. 
 47. Joel Rosenblatt and David Glovin, Moody‘s, S&P Lose Free-Speech Bid to End 
Fraud Suit (Update5), BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aC6m.J60h2Ww (citing 
securities lawyer Patrick Daniels). 
 48. See, e.g., In re Nat‘l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (S.D. Ohio 
2008) (refusing to extend First Amendment protections to a rating that was not issued to the 
general public.  ―Rather, the notes were . . . targeted to a select class of institutional 
investors . . . . And the only place that the ratings are alleged to have appeared were in the 
offering materials given to the select class of investors.‖). 
 49. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751 (1985). 
 50. Id. at 761-62. 
 51. Nathan Koppel, Credit Raters Plead the First.  Will It Fly?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 
2009, at C4 (quoting Larry Ellsworth, former SEC litigator). 
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V.  THE SOLUTION: HOLDING RATINGS AGENCIES LIABLE THROUGH SEC 
RULE 10B-5. 
A broader method of attack against such reckless and damaging 
ratings is to treat them not as mere opinion, but to hold them as legal 
actions, specifically as ―manipulative and deceptive devices‖ under SEC 
Rule 10b-5, section (b).
52
  Rather than limiting complaints to the terms of 
malicious fraud or misrepresentation, this would allow a finding of fact to 
shift the burden of proof to the defendant (the credit rating agency) to 
substantiate its rating with an adequate basis in fact and show that it was 
not recklessly made. 
The original aim of SEC Rule 10b-5 was to prevent corporate 
representatives from making false statements intended on moving the 
market.  Specifically, it was targeted at ―insiders who remained silent about 
a company's position when trading while in the possession of material 
nonpublic information . . . .‖
53
  In response to a very specific situation, the 
rule was crafted in a hurried fashion and in broad language.
54
  Yet, as an 
unintended consequence, the language, which remains unchanged to this 
day, has ―become the ‗catch-all‘ provision for fraud.‖
55
  Moreover, as will 
be shown, Rule 10b-5 extends naturally to the credit rating agencies. 
This line of attack appears to be explicitly endorsed by the recent 
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
56
  
That Act allows a Rule 10b-5 claim against a ratings agency to go forward 
 
 52. SEC Rule 10b-5 reads:  
―It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any 
facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.‖  
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, per 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)). 
 53. Beeson, supra note 2, at 1107. 
 54. Id.  For an insider‘s account of Rule 10b-5‘s inception, see Michael H. Dessent, 
Weapons to Fight Insider Trading in the 21st Century:  A Call for the Repeal of Section 
16(b), 33 AKRON L. REV. 481, 486-87 (2000) (supporting repeal of Exchange Act § 16(b), 
which targets so-called ―short swing‖ profits). 
 55. Beeson, supra note 2, at 1107.  ―Consequently, section 10(b)‘s generality has meant 
that its substance comes from the ad hoc adjudication of the courts and the SEC.‖  Id. at 
1108. 
 56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §933, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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where the agency cannot prove that its ratings of a security were made with 
sufficient precision.
57
  This alone is strong evidence that credit ratings 
agencies fall squarely within the purview of Rule 10b-5. 
Specifically, a proper Rule 10b-5 claim requires a) scienter; b) as to a 
material misrepresentation; c) reliance on that misrepresentation; d) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security; and e) actual economic 
loss or loss causation.
58
  These elements will be set out below as applied to 
the credit rating agencies.  I will not address the final element of a loss 
requirement, considering that an economic loss would need to exist to drive 
litigation in the first instance. 
As a preliminary matter, Section 10b-5 liability requires that the 
misleading statement must be made ―in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.‖
59
  Section 3 of the 1934 Act provides that the term 
―sale‖ shall ―include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of 
[securities].‖
60
  Subsequent case law has been helpful in clarifying this 
requirement. 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores adopted the ―Birnbaum‖ rule 
that ―the plaintiff class for purposes of a private damage action under         
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 was limited to actual purchasers and sellers of 
securities.‖
61
  However, this is not as stark of a rule as it may seem.
62
  The 
limitation only applies to private actions under 10b-5,
63
 and it has been 
explicitly held as so limited.  Additionally, the Supreme Court recently 
stated that ―[u]nder [its] precedents, it is enough that the fraud alleged 
 
 57. Specifically, a motion to dismiss will not be granted where the ―agency has not, 
generally speaking, alleged facts concerning the agency‘s failure to reasonably investigate 
or verify the information on which the agency‘s rating is based.‖  Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple 
Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1666 (2010).  The standard imposed in the Act would be 
knowing or reckless failure to:  ―(i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated 
security with respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own methodology for 
evaluating credit risk; or (ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements 
(which verification may be based on a sampling technique that does not amount to an audit) 
from other sources that the credit rating agency considered to be competent and that were 
independent of the issuer and underwriter.‖  Pub. L. No. 111-203 at § 933(b). 
 58. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). 
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14). 
 61. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (citing 
Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952)). 
 62. See Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091-92 (1991) (finding the 
Blue Chip Stamps standard to be ―instructive‖ for ―illustrating a line between what is and is 
not manageable in the litigation of facts‖ and finding that director statements of opinion did 
not ―implicate [such] concerns‖). 
 63. See Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 
13 n.9 (1971) (stating that ―it is now established that a private right of action is implied 
under § 10(b)‖).  See also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 727 (delineating the contours of 
this judicially created private cause of action). 
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‗coincide‘ with a securities transaction--whether by the plaintiff or by 
someone else.‖
64
  Thus, at the very least, there is no such restriction on the 
SEC for enforcement of 10b-5 against the credit rating agencies, though 
private actions appear to extend more broadly as well.
65
 
 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, the plaintiff 
alleged that broker Merrill Lynch, with the aim of benefitting its customers, 
had unfairly driven up stock prices by releasing misleading information.
66
  
Trying to avoid removal to federal court under preemption through the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
67
 the plaintiff argued 
that he was neither a buyer nor a seller, but a holder of the security.
68
  The 
Second Circuit, relying on Blue Chip Stamp v. Manor Drug Stores, found 
that ―to the extent that the complaint in this action alleged that brokers were 
fraudulently induced, not to sell or purchase, but to retain or delay selling 
their securities, it fell outside SLUSA's pre-emptive scope.‖
69
  The 
Supreme Court reversed, finding instead that: 
The holder class action that respondent tried to plead, and that the 
Second Circuit envisioned, is distinguishable from a typical Rule 
10b-5 class action in only one respect:  It is brought by holders 
instead of purchasers or sellers.  For purposes of SLUSA pre-
emption, that distinction is irrelevant; the identity of the plaintiffs 
does not determine whether the complaint alleges fraud ―in 
connection with the purchase or sale‖ of securities.  The 
misconduct of which respondent complains here--fraudulent 
manipulation of stock prices--unquestionably qualifies as fraud 
―in connection with the purchase or sale‖ of securities . . . .
70
 
While SEC enforcement of Rule 10b-5 is not precluded against the 
credit rating agencies,
71
 these developments reflect a trend to incorporate 
 
 64. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006). 
 65. Moreover, the language in Dabit suggests that, as of 2006, the Court has come to 
view the Blue Chip Stamps rule as excessively restrictive.  Dabit, 547 U.S. at 80.  
Additionally, it may be best to leave this gate-keeping function with the SEC.  In theory, 
this would encourage responsible prosecution and a check on frivolous suits seeking to 
make money off of the natural unpredictability of the marketplace.  See also Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (imposing limits on 
securities fraud class actions). 
 66. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 85. 
 67. Id. at 87 (―SLUSA does not actually pre-empt any state cause of action.  It simply 
denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain claims.  The Act 
does not deny any individual plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs, the 
right to enforce any state-law cause of action that may exist.‖). 
 68. Id. at 76. 
 69. Id. at 77. 
 70. Id. at 89. 
 71. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820-21 (2002) (―[I]n its role enforcing the Act, the 
SEC has consistently adopted a broad reading of the phrase ‗in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security‘. . . . This interpretation of the ambiguous text of § 10(b) . . . is 
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the agencies within Rule 10b-5‘s ―in connection with a sale of a security‖ 
even when the securities do not physically pass through the defendant‘s 
hands.  Thus, if an agency wrongfully manipulates the price of a security, it 
would constitute fraud ―in connection with the purchase or sale of [a] 
security.‖
72
 
A.  Scienter Requirement 
Unlike the ―actual malice‖ standard for fraud,
73
 the standard for 
making such an untrue fact under Rule 10b-5 appears to be recklessness.  
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Supreme Court defined the 10b-5 
scienter requirement as ―a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud,‖
74
 though it specifically left open the question as to 
whether recklessness could trigger liability: 
Neither the intended scope of § 10(b) nor the reasons for the 
changes in its operative language are revealed explicitly in the 
legislative history of the 1934 Act, which deals primarily with 
other aspects of the legislation.  There is no indication, however, 
that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving 
scienter.
75
 
The following year after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court 
reiterated this particular ambiguity, stating that ―[t]he only specific 
reference to § 10 in the Senate Report on the 1934 Act merely states that 
the section was ‗aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices which 
have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function.‘‖
76
  Furthermore, in 
1983, the Supreme Court proclaimed ―we have explicitly left open the 
question whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.‖
77
  This 
uncertainty endures today, though every federal court that has addressed 
this scienter element has found that Rule 10b-5 is satisfied by 
recklessness.
78
  Thus, to hold such institutions liable, a reckless appraisal 
 
entitled to deference if it is reasonable,‖ (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 
229-30 (2001))). 
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.  See infra Section B. Material Misrepresentation / Reliance 
Requirement (discussing the fraud aspect of such a charge). 
 73. See supra Section IV of this Comment (explaining the ―actual malice‖ standard). 
 74. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94, n.12 (1976). 
 75. Id. at 202. 
 76. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474 n.13 (1977) (citing S. REP. NO. 792, at 
6 (1934)). 
 77. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.4 (1983).  See also 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (2007) (refusing to rule 
directly on the issue, but acknowledging that every Court of Appeals has accepted the 
reckless standard). 
 78. David Kaplan, Note, The Scope of Bar Orders in Federal Securities Fraud 
Settlements, 52 DUKE L.J. 211, 216 n.28 (2002) (citing Tower C. Snow et al., Defending 
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would be adequate.  This is important because, as outlined above, there are 
sufficiently egregious examples of these agencies making reckless risk 
appraisals that are not currently being prosecuted.  Moreover, recklessness 
is also a suitably lenient standard in that it would not extend culpability to 
any negligent misrepresentations that would naturally arise in a complex 
financial world. 
It appears that the scienter requirement necessary to trigger Rule 10b-
5 has been increased slightly in recent years.  In light of allegations of false 
and misleading statements to the public by a scientific corporation, the 
Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. again faced 
the question of what is required for a scienter.
79
  The Court determined that 
in order to avoid ―nuisance filings,‖ SEC Rule 10b-5 had evolved a 
heightened pleading standard.
80
  Specifically, the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995
81
 imposed a ―strong inference‖ standard for 
proving a defendant‘s state of mind.
82
  In analyzing such a claim, one must 
look at ―plausible nonculpable explanations for the defendant's conduct, as 
well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.‖
83
  Specifically, ―the reviewing 
court must ask:  When the allegations are accepted as true and taken 
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of scienter at 
least as strong as any opposing inference?‖
84
  Following this clarified 
standard, the Court remanded.
85
 
While it now seems that the reckless requirement has been heightened 
in terms of particularity, this does not foreclose agency prosecution where 
there is ample evidence such as leaked memos, egregious conduct, and 
whistleblowers.
86
  For instance, in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan 
Stanley & Co., the court held that allegations that compensation was 
contingent on the securities selling with the highest ratings was sufficient to 
 
Securities Class Actions, 2 A.L.I. PROC. 789, 834-41 (2000)); see also Robert N. Clemens 
Trust v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that ―we have 
‗long premised liability on at least reckless behavior.‘‖ (citing Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 
F.3d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 2001))); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 
(6th Cir. 1979) (holding that ―mere negligence is not enough for liability‖). 
 79. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314-17 (2007) 
(discussing how to weigh competing facts in order to come to a finding of scienter). 
 80. See id. at 320-21 (discussing the evolution of a heightened pleading standard). 
 81. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 15 of the United States Code). 
 82. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 321 (explaining how the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act‘s heightened pleading standard imposes a difficult burden on plaintiffs). 
 83. Id. at 324. 
 84. Id. at 326. 
 85. Id. at 329. 
 86. PR Diamonds, Inc. v. Chandler, 364 F.3d 671, 686 (6th Cir. 2004) (ruling that while 
it is unclear what exactly might satisfy this standard, ―[s]pecific factual allegations that a 
defendant ignored red flags, or warning signs that would have revealed the accounting errors 
prior to their inclusion in public statements, may support a strong inference of scienter‖). 
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support an inference of motive.
87
 
B.  Material Misrepresentation / Reliance Requirement 
In order to trigger Rule 10b-5, section (b) liability, a report must 
constitute an ―untrue statement of material fact.‖
88
  Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
reiterated that materiality is a fact-based inquiry that ―depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or 
misrepresented information.‖
89
  TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. held that 
an ―omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.‖
90
 
Following this standard, Zewig v. Hearst Corporation found a mere 
lack of objectivity (analogous to the conflict of interest problem present 
with the credit rating agencies, raised above) was sufficiently material to 
trigger liability under 10b-5.
91
  Here, a financial columnist who habitually 
inflated stock prices after purchasing large amounts of stock was sued by 
two recipients of the overvalued stock for damages.
92
  ―Reasonable 
investors who read the column would have considered the motivations of a 
financial columnist . . . important in deciding whether to invest in the 
companies touted.‖
93
  The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, 
finding ―the federal securities laws, in guarding the public from abuses, 
strictly circumscribe the opportunities of persons holding certain positions 
to profit from their positions.‖
94
 
Specifically, Rule 10b-5 has enjoyed its most ready application to 
misstatements of material fact made by corporate boards.  Notably, in 
1968, the Second Circuit held in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. that such 
statements could be actionable as false or deceptive misrepresentations: 
More important, however, is the realization which we must again 
underscore at the risk of repetition, that the investing public is 
hurt by exposure to false or deceptive statements irrespective of 
 
 87. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d at 179 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (―[B]ecause the Rating Agencies were responsible for determining and 
issuing their ratings and devised the models that produced the allegedly unreasonably high 
ratings, the Rating Agencies had the opportunity to assign misleading ratings.  Plaintiffs 
have thus sufficiently pled scienter as to the Rating Agencies.‖). 
 88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). 
 89. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 (1988). 
 90. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc.. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 91. Zewig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that financial 
writer‘s undisclosed lack of objectivity was an omitted material fact). 
 92. Id. at 1265. 
 93. Id. at 1266. 
 94. Id. at 1271. 
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the purpose underlying their issuance.  It does not appear to be 
unfair to impose upon corporate management a duty to ascertain 
the truth of any statements the corporation releases to its 
shareholders or to the investing public at large.  Accordingly, we 
hold that Rule 10b-5 is violated whenever assertions are made, as 
here, in a manner reasonably calculated to influence the investing 
public, e.g., by means of the financial media . . . if such 
assertions are false or misleading or are so incomplete as to 
mislead irrespective of whether the issuance of the release was 
motivated by corporate officials for ulterior purposes.
95
 
Specifically mentioning the financial media and the public at large, 
this holding strongly suggests that potential liability for credit rating 
agencies under Rule 10b-5 would fit squarely within the Rule‘s intended 
scope. 
The concept of the reasonable investor has been refined by the 
Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson to constitute ―reliance and the 
fraud-on-the-market theory‖ in situations where a common law fraud has 
been established.
96
  The Court has developed a presumption that investors 
rely on public information unless there is an affirmative showing that 
destroys any causal link.
97
  In the face of allegations of corporate 
statements artificially lowering stock prices, the Court found that ―[f]or 
purposes of accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need 
only believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly 
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock 
market prices.‖
98
  While this particular case was one of a ―materially 
misleading statement by the corporation,‖ not of an outside rating agency,
99
 
this should be a rather simple extension by analogy. 
The recent case DeMarco v. Lehman Brothers has narrowed this 
avenue of attack, finding that ―there is a qualitative difference between a 
 
 95. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 96. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242 (1988).  In Wiggins v. Janus Capital 
Group, Inc., the plaintiffs alleged that Janus Capital Group had made misleading statements 
in their prospectus pertaining to their investment practices, causing their investors to lose 
money when contrary practices became known.  In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 
114-15 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3325 (U.S. Nov. 23, 2010) (No. 09-525).  
Interpreting the Basic rule, the court wrote that to satisfy the fraud-on-the-market theory, 
―the defendant must make a misrepresentation that is public and is attributable to the 
defendant.  This requirement is necessary to ensure that the misleading information ‗is 
reflected in the market price of the security.‘‖  Id. at 121 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, 
LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008)).  The court held that the 
prospectus statements were sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal under a fraud-on-
the-market reliance theory.  Id. at 127. 
 97. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49. 
 98. Id. at 246 n.24. 
 99. Id. at 226. 
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statement of fact emanating from an issuer and a statement of opinion 
emanating from a research analyst.  A well-developed efficient market can 
reasonably be presumed to translate the former into an effect on price, 
whereas no such presumption attaches to the latter.‖
100
  Specifically, the 
court required some additional quantum of evidence in order to establish 
the necessary causal connection in the case of an analyst‘s misstatement, as 
opposed to that of an issuer.
101
  In DeMarco, a Lehman Brothers analyst 
encouraged investment in a particular common stock while privately 
maintaining contrary beliefs.
102
  Although the plaintiffs did not plead with 
sufficient evidence to trigger a fraud on the market theory,
103
 the court 
explicitly found that such allegations, if true, could generally be sufficient 
to merit fraud for a particularized Rule 10b-5 violation.
104
 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. appears to 
gloss over this question of reliance.
105
  Where a ratings agency argued that 
reliance was improper for ―sophisticated investors,‖ the court retorted that 
―the market at large, including sophisticated investors, have come to rely 
on the accuracy of credit ratings and the independence of rating agencies 
because of their NRSRO [Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organization] status and . . . the Rating Agencies' access to non-public 
information that even sophisticated investors cannot obtain.‖
106
  Following 
this analysis, it appears quite possible to find reasonable reliance on these 
agencies, both legally and intuitively. 
Finally, it is not necessary that there be an affirmative duty to disclose 
 
 100. DeMarco v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 222 F.R.D. 243, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 101. See id. at 247 (―[A] statement of opinion emanating from a research analyst is far 
more subjective and far less certain, and often appears in tandem with conflicting opinions 
from other analysts as well as new statements from the issuer.  As a result, no automatic 
impact on the price of a security can be presumed and instead must be proven and measured 
before the statement can be said to have ‗defrauded the market‘ in any material way that is 
not simply speculative.‖). 
 102. Id. at 245. 
 103. Id. at 247 (arguing that in order ―to qualify for class certification in a case where, as 
here, such certification is dependent on invocation of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, the 
plaintiff must adduce admissible evidence that facially meets the aforementioned standard, 
i.e., that makes a prima facie showing that the analyst‘s statements alleged to be false or 
fraudulent materially and measurably impacted the market price of the security to which the 
statements relate‖). 
 104. Id. at 245. 
 105. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 106. Id. at 181.  ―In assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff‘s alleged reliance, we 
consider the entire context of the transaction, including factors such as its complexity and 
magnitude, the sophistication of the parties, and the content of any agreements between 
them.‖  Id. at 180-81 (quoting Crigger v. Fahnestock & Co., 443 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 
2006)). 
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information or opinions for an activity to be actionable under Rule 10b-5.
107
  
Specifically, a ―lack of an independent duty is not . . . a defense to Rule 
10b-5 liability because upon choosing to speak, one must speak truthfully 
about material issues.‖
108
  Thus, even if the ratings agencies were acting as 
a mere public service, their promulgation of any rating—having met all the 
other Rule 10b-5 elements—would still actionable outside of any fiduciary 
relationship. 
VI.  THERE IS PRECEDENT FOR SUCH LIABILITY FOR STATEMENTS OF 
OPINION IN THE SECURITIES CONTEXT. 
In the case of Franklin Savings Bank v. Levy, the Second Circuit 
found that ratings agencies could be potentially liable under Section 10b.
109
  
There, commercial paper dealer Goldman Sachs, the sole dealer in 
commercial notes for Penn Central Transportation Agency (Penn Central), 
bestowed upon Penn Central the highest rating of ―prime‖ and sold shares 
to Franklin Savings Bank.
110
  (Like many requirements of law mentioned 
earlier, banks in the state of New York were only allowed to purchase 
securities which had been given a ―highest rating‖ by an independent 
agency.)
111
  At the time of the purchase, Penn Central had already 
experienced heavy losses, and Goldman had attempted to force Penn 
Central to buy back some of its own holdings.
112
  Moreover, a separate 
investment bank, holding fifteen percent of Penn Central‘s commercial 
paper, had concurrently removed Penn Central from its list of approved 
investments.
113
  Penn Central went bankrupt before the maturity date, and 
Franklin Savings Bank was never paid.
114
 
Franklin Savings Bank alleged that it had been cheated, but Goldman 
argued that their rating constituted ―merely an opinion only actionable if 
that opinion was dishonestly or recklessly held.‖
115
  Yet, the Second Circuit 
found that in certain circumstances a rating could be regarded as a fact: 
We have been loath . . . to permit a broker-dealer to escape 
liability under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act by recourse to the fact-
opinion dichotomy.  We have held that where a broker-dealer 
 
 107. See Caiola v. Citibank, 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (concerning a bank that 
misrepresented the nature of the investments it was making on behalf of a substantial client). 
 108. Id. at 331. 
 109. Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 110. Id. at 522-23. 
 111. Id.  See supra Section III of this Comment (outlining the general existence of 
ratings requirements for certain institutional investors). 
 112. Id. at 523. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 526 (Responding to §12(2) under the 1933 Act). 
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makes a representation as to the quality of the security he sells, 
he impliedly represents that he has an adequate basis in fact for 
the opinion he renders.
116
 
In finding the potential for liability under Section 12(2) of the 1933 
Act,
117
 the court went as far as to find that representations can be 
misleading in fact even if they are honestly believed in practice: 
If Goldman, Sachs failed to exercise reasonable professional care 
in assembling and evaluating the financial data, particularly in 
view of the worsening condition of Penn Central, then its 
representation that the paper was credit worthy and high quality 
was untrue in fact and misleading no matter how honestly but 
mistakenly held.
118
 
Under this view, the court devised a system of burden-shifting.  ―[I]t 
in fact makes the dealer responsible . . . if it is unable to shoulder the 
burden of establishing that it was not reasonable for it to have determined . 
. . the quality of the paper it was purveying was less than that 
represented.‖
119
  Unfortunately, this analysis did not carry over to the 
Section 10b-5 analysis, which got stuck on the strong scienter requirement 
that had been recently established by Hochfelder.
120
  However, as 
established above, such a burden may no longer be accurate, and is not 
required for prosecution by the SEC.
121
 
In another case stemming from the Penn Central debacle, 
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., a suit was 
initiated against a credit rating agency that provided credit appraisals 
exclusively to subscribers.
122
  Specifically, the rating agency had rated the 
 
 116. Id. at 527. 
 117. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act provides for similar liability as Rule 10b-5 for 
misleading statements (―includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements‖), but could not be applied to ratings 
agencies as the Act is limited to ―issuers‖ of securities, meaning ―every person who issues 
or proposes to issue any security.‖  15 U.S.C. §§ 77l(a)(2), 77b(a)(4). 
 118. Franklin Sav., 551 F.2d at 527. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 529 (finding that the lower court‘s opinion ―never found that Goldman, Sachs 
possessed an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud‖). 
 121. See supra Section IV of this Comment (elaborating on the scienter requirement for 
Rule 10b-5). 
 122. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. 231, 235-36 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).  Although the court may have been more willing to consider Rule 10b-5 
liability in the presence of such privity, see supra Section IV of this Comment, the court 
also found that ―one would be naive to believe that [the agency] was completely unaware 
that purchasers on occasion did inquire from the seller as to the rating.‖  Mallinckrodt, 420 
F. Supp. at 236.  ―The NCO rating is not like a bond rating that is published and quoted for 
the world to see, nor is the rating available to the general public.  However, when 
specifically asked by customers what the rating was, some . . . salesmen would tell them.‖ 
Id.  Moreover, the plaintiff in this case was not himself a subscriber.  Id. at 234.  While the 
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Penn Central Transportation Company‘s commercial paper as ―prime‖—
the only grade of security the plaintiff would agree to purchase.
123
  The 
court, assuming that the rating ―was a statement of fact, rather than an 
opinion‖ found that the ―prime‖ rating was acceptable, and that ―if there 
was a misstatement of fact, it was an unwitting one.‖
124
  While seemingly 
willing to go forward on the Rule 10b-5 claim against the ratings agency, 
this court also got stuck on the scienter requirement for the question of 
ultimate liability. 
Similarly, Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg is another example of 
potential statements of opinion leading to liability.
125
  There, the corporate 
directors solicited proxies seeking approval by the minority shareholders of 
a ―freeze out‖ merger where they would lose their interests for cash 
reimbursement.
126
  In doing so, the directors ―urged the proposal's adoption 
and stated they had approved the plan because of its opportunity for the 
minority shareholders to achieve a ‗high‘ value, which they elsewhere 
described as a ‗fair‘ price, for their stock.‖
127
  Petitioner Sandberg argued 
liability under Rule 14(a)
128
 that the directors did not truly believe that the 
price was high or fair, but instead such statements were only made to 
protect their board positions.
129
 
The court affirmed the jury decision upholding Sandberg‘s 
appraisal.
130
  They further agreed that ―a statement of belief by corporate 
directors about a recommended course of action, or an explanation of their 
reasons for recommending it . . . ‖ could be sufficiently material.
131
  
Moreover, the conclusory nature of such statements was not dispositive: 
Provable facts either furnish good reasons to make a conclusory 
commercial judgment, or they count against it, and expressions of 
such judgments can be uttered with knowledge of truth or falsity 
just like more definite statements, and defended or attacked 
 
court went on to find no actual reliance by the plaintiff on the credit rating, this was not for 
lack of a subscription, but simply a finding of fact that the plaintiff had relied instead on his 
own judgment.  Id. at 243. 
 123. Id. at 233. 
 124. Id. at 241-42.  ―There is no evidence that NCO‘s judgments on PCTC were not 
made in good faith or that its judgments or reports were false.‖  Id. at 243. 
 125. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). 
 126. Id. at 1087-88. 
 127. Id. at 1088. 
 128. Rule 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pertains to the solicitation of 
proxies.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a. 
 129. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1088–89. 
 130. Id. at 1090. 
 131. Id. at 1090–91.  See also Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(―Material statements which contain the speaker‘s opinion are actionable under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act if the speaker does not believe the opinion and the 
opinion is not factually well-grounded.‖). 
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through the orthodox evidentiary process that either substantiates 
their underlying justifications or tends to disprove their existence 
. . . . However conclusory the directors' statement may have been, 
then, it was open to attack by garden-variety evidence, subject 
neither to a plaintiff's control nor ready manufacture, and there 
was no undue risk of open-ended liability or uncontrollable 
litigation in allowing respondents the opportunity for recovery on 
the allegation that it was misleading to call $42 ‗high.‘
132
 
Of course, proof would be necessary in order to establish the existence 
of statements based on disbelief.
133
 
Unfortunately for Sandberg, the court‘s reasoning ultimately did not 
culminate in his favor--the court concluded that there was no federal 
remedy for the minority shareholders, who were alone insufficient to 
overturn the merger, regardless of the culpability of the representations.
134
  
Yet, taken together, these cases analogize well to potential cases the credit 
rating context and the enforceability of Rule 10b-5 therein.  
VII.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
While the market for complicated investments is naturally volatile, 
such assumption of risk should not work to foreclose any and all liability 
against the credit raters.  Risk-taking is an inherent part of securities 
trading, but it is an entirely different risk than the threat of deceit based on 
reckless and material misrepresentations.  Investors should be concerned 
about the future of the market and their particular portfolios, but they 
should not be burdened with the additional concern that the ratings 
agencies they are dependent upon are engaged in fraud, especially in 
instances where investors are forced by law to rely on those agencies.  
Credit raters should not be allowed to represent that they offer a profitable 
product to help hedge market risk while simultaneously hiding behind that 
same risk to avoid any and all accountability. 
Concerns that the threat of liability for these agencies will cause a 
dearth of ratings are similarly unfounded.  Since the standard for Rule 10b-
5 is only recklessness, it will merely encourage appropriate caution in 
calculating ratings and eliminate instances of purposeful misconduct—an 
optimal balance.  To any extent that this may lead to a ―limited chilling 
effect‖ it might not be a terrible outcome for an industry predisposed to 
heedlessness (especially in the face of market bubbles that skew and dilute 
perceptions of risk).  Clearly, setting a de facto bar to any enforcement only 
 
 132. Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1093–95. 
 133. Id. at 1096 (reinforcing the concept of a higher burden of proof for the moving party 
in commercial contexts). 
 134. Id. at 1106 (denying petitioner‘s conclusory argument). 
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encourages ratings to develop without sufficient caution, leading to risky 
and inaccurate appraisals that will eventually culminate in catastrophe.  In 
comparison, a slight reduction in excessively optimistic ratings does not 
seem so troublesome.  As long as there is a market for investments, there 
will always be a market for honest assessment of those investments.  Thus, 
the potential for reasonable liability will encourage the ultimate goal of 
fostering diligent and responsible evaluation of such securities. 
Proving recklessness presents a complex task, and agencies will 
inevitably get away with unfounded appraisals under such a standard.  Yet, 
as this comment makes clear, there are sufficient examples in this crisis of 
clear reckless conduct, and discovery in a well-pleaded case would get at 
the appropriate evidence, should it exist.  Liability mechanisms will also 
serve to incentivize investors and regulators to bring potential problems to 
the rating agencies‘ attention, knowing that the agencies would not be free 
to ignore the problem.  Finally, setting the culpability standard at ―reckless‖ 
encourages an optimal level of responsibility against a reasonable amount 
of protection for the agencies, avoiding an excessive chilling effect and 
benefiting the market as a whole.    
The major hurdle to 10b-5 liability is that courts have traditionally 
deferred to the firms‘ supposed First Amendment protections.
135
  
Additionally, the courts have expressed similar concern that these agencies 
do not meet the requirement of ―in connection with the sale of a security.‖  
But as I have shown, these hurdles have been overcome singularly in a 
variety of contexts, meaning they are not insurmountable and are no longer 
appropriate barriers to the consistent application of Rule 10b-5 in the rating 
agency context. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
Public policy demands a reliable liability mechanism to deter the 
ratings agencies from making self-interested, but ultimately detrimental, 
misstatements.  Thus, there is every reason to utilize SEC Rule 10b-5 on its 
own terms to police such misrepresentations on the part of these agencies.  
It is a natural fit.  The securities markets have undergone many changes 
since Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, and the increasing complexity 
of these markets, combined with the corresponding growth of the ratings 
agencies, certainly merit the application of Rule 10b-5—especially in light 
of recent economic lessons. 
Such application of the Rule would not mean unlimited liability for 
 
 135. See Deryn Darcy, Survey, Credit Rating Agencies and the Credit Crisis:  How the 
“Issuer Pays” Conflict Contributed and What Regulators Might Do About It, 2009 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 605, 632 (identifying court protection of ratings under the First Amendment as 
a hurdle when attempting to hold agencies liable). 
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credit rating agencies, but a mere burden shifting under a recklessness 
standard.  From a policy perspective, this offers a device not only for future 
deterrence, but also for accountability by compelling such agencies to 
prove that their ratings were not unfounded, as many of them have 
tragically been.  Investors rely on these ratings, in the exact same way they 
rely on corporate disclosure documents, and they should be held to a 
corresponding standard, to the level Rule 10b-5 demands. 
 
 
